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3EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
For more than two decades, the development of renewable energy sources (RES) has
been an important aim of EU energy policy. It accelerated with the adoption of a
1997 White Paper and the setting a decade later of a 20% renewable energy target,
to be reached by 2020. The EU counts on renewable energy for multiple purposes: to
diversify its energy supply; to increase its security of supply; and to create new indus-
tries, jobs, economic growth and export opportunities, while at the same time
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Many expectations rest on its develop-
ment.
Fossil fuels have been critical to the development of industrial nations, including EU
Member States, which are now deeply reliant upon coal, oil and gas for nearly every
aspect of their existence. Faced with some hard truths, however, the Member States
have begun to shelve fossil fuel. These hard truths are as follows: firstly, fossil fuels
are a finite resource, sometimes difficult to extract. This means that, at some point,
fossil fuels are going to be more difficult to access in Europe or too expensive to use.1
The problem is that you cannot just stop using fossil fuels when they become too
expensive; the existing infrastructure is profoundly reliant on fossil fuels. It is thus
almost normal that a fierce resistance to change exists. Secondly, fossil fuels
contribute to climate change. They emit GHG, which contribute greatly to climate
change. As a consequence, their use needs to be drastically reduced. Thirdly,
Member States are currently suffering a decline in their own fossil fuel production.
This increases their dependence on increasingly costly fossil fuel imports from
increasingly unstable countries. This problem is compounded by global develop-
ments: the growing share of emerging economies in global energy demand (in
particular China and India but also the Middle East) and the development of uncon-
ventional oil and gas production in the United States. All these elements endanger
the competitiveness of Member States’ economies and their security of supply.
Therefore, new indigenous sources of energy and a diversification of energy
suppliers and routes to convey energy need to be found.
To solve all these challenges, in 2008 the EU put in place a strategy based on three
objectives: sustainability (reduction of GHG), competitiveness and security of supply.
The adoption of a renewable energy policy was considered essential for reaching
these three strategic objectives.
1 The abundant reserves of coal and unconventional fossil fuels (oil and gas) and the revolution of fossil fuel
technologies will not change anything. They will postpone the occurrence of these two events but will not
delay them indefinitely. In addition, it should be remembered that to keep global warming under 2°C – a
goal that the most conservative governments have agreed to meet – a large part of these reserves must be
left underground to prevent a climate catastrophe.
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The adoption of the 20% renewable energy target has undeniably had a positive
effect in the EU on the growth in renewables, with the result that renewable energy
sources are steadily increasing their presence in the EU energy mix. They are now, it
can be said, an integral part of the EU energy system.
However, the necessity of reaching this 20% renewable energy target in 2020,
combined with other circumstances, has also engendered in many Member States a
certain number of difficulties, creating uncertainties for investors and postponing
benefits for consumers. The electricity sector is the clearest example of this down-
side. Subsidies have become extremely abundant and vary from one Member State
to another, compromising both fair competition and single market. Networks
encountered many difficulties to develop and adapt. With technological progress
these subsidies have also become quite excessive. The growing impact of renewable
electricity fluctuations has made some traditional power plants unprofitable and
created disincentives for new investments. The EU does clearly need to reassess its
strategy. If it repeats the 2008 measures it will risk to provoke increased instability
and costs.
5INTRODUCTION
For more than two decades, the development of renewable energy sources (RES) has
been an important aim of EU energy policy.2 It accelerated with the adoption of a
1997 White Paper3 and the setting a decade later of a 20% renewable energy target,
to be reached by 2020. The EU counts on renewable energy for multiple purposes: to
diversify its energy supply; to increase its security of supply; and to create new indus-
tries, jobs, economic growth and export opportunities, while at the same time
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Many expectations rest on its develop-
ment.
The adoption of the 20% renewable energy target has undeniably had a positive
effect in the EU on the growth in renewables, with the result that renewable energy
sources are steadily increasing their presence in the EU energy mix. They are now, it
can be said, an integral part of the EU energy system.
However, the necessity of reaching this 20% renewable energy target in 2020,
combined with other circumstances, has also engendered in many Member States
a certain number of difficulties, creating uncertainties for investors and postponing
benefits for consumers. The electricity sector is the clearest example of this down-
side. The most spectacular growth of renewables has occurred in this sector,4 in
particular, as a result of the use of wind power and solar photovoltaics to produce
electricity. None of the approaches thus far adopted to promote the development
of these two technologies have been universally accepted as effective and effi-
cient.
The paper will first recap why the development of RES is necessary (§ 1), then
describe the genesis of the renewable energy policy (§ 2). Next, it will examine the
progress made within the EU towards its overall 2020 RES objective (§ 3). Electricity
generated from renewable sources lies at the heart of the current debate, and we
will henceforth concentrate on this topic.5 Fourthly, the paper will address more
specifically the challenges entailed by the growth of wind energy and solar energy in
the electricity sector (§ 4). Finally, it will present a series of general considerations
2 As early as 1986, the Council listed the promotion of RES among its energy objectives (OJ C 241 of
28.09.1986, p. 1). See also COM(97) 599 final, p. 6.
3 COM(97) 599. This document was preceded by the 1996 Green Paper Energy for the future: Renewable
sources of energy – COM(96) 576.
4 Reliance on imported fossil fuels is still high in heating and transport for most Member States, where the
use of renewables has only marginally increased since 2005. See Commission’s document SWD(2014) 330
final/2, p. 131.
5 For the (quite different) questions raised by renewables in transport, see T. Zgajewski, The EU regime on
biofuels in transport: Still in search of sustainability, Egmont Paper 68, July 2014.
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and evolutions envisaged by the European Commission in its climate and energy
package for the period 2020-2030 (§ 5).6
Tania Zgajewski7
6 Research for this paper stopped at the end of August 2014.
7 Tania Zgajewski is a Senior Research Fellow at Egmont and a member of the board of HERA/CEEI. She was
for a long time a Research Fellow at the University of Liège.
7§ 1. THE NECESSITY OF DEVELOPING RENEWABLES
1.1. Recap: three strategic objectives
Fossil fuels have been critical to the development of industrial nations, including
EU Member States, which are now deeply reliant upon coal, oil and gas for nearly
every aspect of their existence. Faced with some hard truths, however, the
Member States have begun to shelve fossil fuel. These hard truths are as follows:
firstly, fossil fuels are a finite resource, sometimes difficult to extract. This means
that, at some point, fossil fuels are going to be more difficult to access in Europe or
too expensive to use.8 The problem is that you cannot just stop using fossil fuels
when they become too expensive; the existing infrastructure is profoundly reliant
on fossil fuels. It is thus almost normal that a fierce resistance to change exists.
Secondly, fossil fuels contribute to climate change. They emit GHG, which
contribute greatly to climate change. As a consequence, their use needs to be dras-
tically reduced. Thirdly, Member States are currently suffering a decline in their
own fossil fuel production. This increases their dependence on increasingly costly
fossil fuel imports from increasingly unstable countries.9 This problem is
compounded by global developments: the growing share of emerging economies
in global energy demand (in particular China and India but also the Middle East)
and the development of unconventional oil and gas production in the United
States. All these elements endanger the competitiveness of Member States’ econ-
omies and their security of supply. Therefore, new indigenous sources of energy
and a diversification of energy suppliers and routes to convey energy need to be
found.
To solve all these challenges, the EU put in place a strategy based on three objectives:
sustainability (reduction of GHG), competitiveness and security of supply. The adop-
tion of a renewable energy policy was considered essential for reaching these three
strategic objectives.
Today, nothing has changed. As a matter of fact, all three strategic objectives remain
valid and have even become more urgent. Firstly, GHG emissions continue to rise and
carbon prices are not in use in certain regions or countries, or are low, as is the case
8 The abundant reserves of coal and unconventional fossil fuels (oil and gas) and the revolution of fossil fuel
technologies will not change anything. They will postpone the occurrence of these two events but will not
delay them indefinitely. In addition, it should be remembered that to keep global warming under 2°C – a
goal that the most conservative governments have agreed to meet – a large part of these reserves must be
left underground to prevent a climate catastrophe.
9 The EU external energy bill represents today more than €1 billion per day (around €400 billion for the
whole of 2013) and more than a fifth of total EU imports. See the Commission communication European
Energy Security Strategy: Comprehensive plan for the reduction of EU energy dependence – COM(2014)
330, p. 1.
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in the EU.10 Secondly, the global demand for primary energy (coal and gas) will
continue to surge in the next few years, putting Europe in competition with other
parts of the world.11 Thirdly, in the medium term, the gas and electricity price differ-
ential should remain unfavourable to Europe, with the consequence that it could
induce the relocation of energy-intensive activities outside the EU, or a sharp fall in
new investments in those activities. Unless a miracle occurs, these three reasons
alone explain why it is crucial that Europe continues to develop its renewable ener-
gies and robustly improve its energy efficiency.
Obviously, the shift to more renewable energy will take time. In the near future, the
EU energy system will still be based on fossil fuels (ideally natural gas, to the exclu-
sion of coal), hopefully at the lowest cost and in the most sustainable fashion
possible.
1.2. The EU’s problematic definition of renewable energy 
sources
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), renewable energy is ‘derived
from natural processes ... that are replenished at a faster rate than they are
consumed.’12 At EU level, and according to Article 2 (a) of Directive 2009/28/EC
currently in force, energy from renewable sources means ‘energy from renewable
non-fossil sources, namely wind, solar, aerothermal, geothermal, hydrothermal and
ocean energy, hydropower, biomass, landfill gas, sewage treatment plant gas and
biogases.’
By comparison with the IEA definition, the EU definition is just an enumeration of
non-fossil sources which can produce energy. It remains silent on the varying sustain-
ability of these sources.
As a consequence, in the EU, subsidy regimes and other policies that promote renew-
able energy encourage some types of energy which are classed as ‘renewable’ by the
EU, but which are in fact utterly unsustainable, and result in highly negative climate,
environmental and human impacts. This is particularly the case for biomass sources.
Biomass policies have focused on large-scale wood combustion for electricity and
heat – which depends on increased logging and the expansion of monoculture tree
plantations – and a greater use of transport biofuels (also referred as ‘transport agro-
fuels’). The enormous volume needed to meet an open and global market could be
10 For instance, in February 2014, the CO2 allowance price under the EU ETS reached €6.90 per tonne (news
dated 18 February 2014, published on http://www.citepa.org/en/news/1450-17-february-2014-eu-ets-
carbon-price-hits-new-13-month-high). In the period up to 2020, EU CO2 allowances are expected to trade
in a range of €5-10 on average (see an article published in Platts dated 4 June 2014: http://
www.platts.com/latest-news/electric-power/london/eu-co2-prices-to-average-eur5-10mt-to-2020-survey-
26804376).
11 See SWD(2014) 330 final/3, pp. 13 and 101-102 for Europe.
12 http://www.iea.org/aboutus/faqs/renewableenergy/
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extremely damaging in many aspects. In addition, there is a growing volume of
evidence that industrial bioenergy (both biomass combustion and transport biofuels)
commonly causes more GHG emissions than the fossil fuels they replace. A growing
volume of peer-reviewed studies documents the scale of these emissions, which
result from indirect land-use change, increased fertilizer use and other causes.13 This
reduces considerably the GHG benefits of using biomass and contributes to climate
change. With about half of the 2020 renewables objective depending on biomass,14
this is worrying.
Furthermore, with this definition of renewable sources, EU legislation has not been
very inclined to introduce binding sustainability criteria for the use of biomass for
energy. It has achieved this for biofuels for transport (but there are few criteria and
the way they are defined is clearly unsatisfactory), it has not done it for biomass used
for electricity and heat (only recommendations to Member States have been
adopted so far).15
All this shows that the existing EU definition needs to be revised.
1.3. The limits
If the use of renewable energy as an alternative to fossil fuels has advantages, one
must also be aware of its disadvantages.
1.3.1. Energy intensity and intermittency/variability
One disadvantage with RES is that it is difficult to generate quantities of electricity as
large as those produced by traditional fossil fuel generators. This may mean that we
need either to reduce the amount of energy we use, notably through energy effi-
ciency measures, or simply build more renewable energy facilities.
Another disadvantage of renewable energy sources is the reliability of supply.
Renewable energy often depends on the weather for its source of power. Hydro
generators need rain to fill dams to supply flowing water. Wind turbines need wind
13 In response to these issues, the Commission has tabled a legislative proposal still under negotiation.
Proposal for a directive amending Directive 98/70/EC relating to the quality of petrol and diesel fuels and
amending Directive 2009/82/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable source,
COM(2012)595. See also T. Zgajewski, The EU regime on biofuels in transport: still in search of sustainability,
Egmont Paper 68, July 2014.
14 C. Panoutsou (Imperial College London), B. Kretschmer (Institute for European Environmental Policy), A.
Uslu and J. van Stralen (Energy research Centre of Netherlands), Biomass role for heat, electricity/CHP and
transport in EU27 for 2020 and 2030: Summary for policy makers (policy briefing under D6.4), p. 464 (http:/
/www.biomassfutures.eu/public_docs/final_deliverables/WP6/D6.4%20Biomass%20role%20for%20heat%
20electricity%20and%20transport%20biofuels%20for%20EU27%20in%202020.pdf). This publication is part
of the Biomass Futures Project funded by the EU’s European Intelligent Energy Europe Programme. The
goal of the project is to analyse the role that bioenergy can play in meeting the EU’s renewable energy
targets.
15 SWD(2014) 259 final, p. 27.
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to turn the blades and generate electricity. Solar photovoltaics need cloudless skies
and sunshine to collect light and make electricity. When these resources are unavail-
able, no energy is generated. In addition, wind power and solar power are variable in
output. Today, although progress has been made, it is almost impossible to accu-
rately forecast wind and solar production.
All this indicates that the energy mix remains essential: renewable energy needs to
be backed up by fossil fuel capacity. It also shows that further research on energy
storage technologies should be a priority to ensure an adequate power supply to the
grid.16 Clearly, energy storage has become the bottleneck that blocks the energy
paradigm’s shift to renewables.17
1.3.2. Even clean alternatives like renewables require fossil fuels
Even if the EU narrowed its definition of RES to methods that do not increase pollu-
tion or deplete natural resources, it would remain an idealized definition. In practice,
none of our existing RES would strictly meet it. It is not even clear that some renew-
able energy options would be viable without the fossil fuel inputs on which they
currently rely. In such cases, these options are clearly not truly renewable due to
their fossil fuel dependence, even though many of them are treated as such.
Three examples can be given: solar, wind, biofuels. If solar panels and wind turbines
create zero emissions in their generation of electricity, the manufacturing process by
which their component parts are created is entirely reliant on fossil fuel inputs. Wind
turbines are made from steel, the production of which is heavily dependent on coal.
They are anchored by concrete, the production of which is a major source of CO2
emissions. Cheap plastic photovoltaics require polymers made from oil. Both wind
turbines and solar panels are produced from scarce rare earth elements. Crops for
fuel production are typically grown with fertilizer made from natural gas, as well as
pesticides and herbicides derived from petroleum. Corn ethanol is produced using
steam normally derived from natural gas, and electricity mostly produced from
natural gas or coal. Biodiesel is usually created from an oil feedstock derived from
crops and from methanol, which is normally made from natural gas. Many advanced
biofuels depend on hydrogen for upgrading, and hydrogen is made almost exclu-
sively from natural gas.
16 Today there are three electricity storage technologies that are considered valid options. The first is pumped
hydroelectric storage (PHS). PHS uses excess energy to elevate water that can later be dropped onto a
turbine to generate electricity. The second is compressed-air energy storage (CAES). In this technology, air
is compressed and stored in large tanks. When needed, the air is released to drive a turbine that generates
electricity. The third is battery technology. Each of these technologies have their limits, and a lot of work
still needs to be done to make them feasible options for large-scale energy storage from renewable
sources.
17 See J. Auer and J. Keil, State-of-the-art electricity storage systems – Indispensable elements of the energy
revolution, Deutsche Bank, 2012.
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It is obvious that with renewable energy, as with all energy sources, we have to make
trade-offs. Another important element is that we need to shift away from fossil fuels
regardless of CO2 emissions. So renewable energy makes sense for the future since
its potential, if accompanied by technological improvements, is enormous. But
shifting from one source of energy to another does not make sense if it is a simple
way to tell people ‘do not worry, you can still consume and go on with your life.’ It
would be a lazy approach to a complex problem. So, in parallel with the development
of renewables, our greatest short-term and mid-term gains lie in continuing to
improve efficiency, in particular because before long it will be difficult to quit fossil
fuels.
This is all the more important because in its April 2013 report Tracking clean energy
progress, the IEA highlighted the rise of global energy consumption and the fact that
the CO2 quantity emitted for each energy unit supplied has fallen by less than 1%
since 1990, mainly because of the increased use of coal – the filthiest and most
polluting form of energy and the most dangerous to extract18 – and because of the
use of inefficient technologies.19 This trend is partly relevant for the EU, which has
trouble doing without cheap coal despite environmental concerns. This coal renais-
sance and the push to exploit unconventional oil and gas reserves in the EU could
threaten efforts to curb carbon emissions, despite the results obtained so far.20
1.3.3. The incorporation of renewables into existing infrastructures
The integration of large quantities of RES such as wind and solar power will require
changes in the way our transmission system operates. Solutions need to be found
and huge investments need to be made.
This integration also demands the extension and upgrading of the networks them-
selves. Here, too, huge investments need to be made. Although, to be fair, wind and
solar power are not the only technologies which will benefit from these improve-
ments.
18 For instance, according to an article written by Simon Jenkins entitled ‘Renewable energy won’t rid us of
the horrors of coal’ (Guardian, 15 May 2014), over 1,000 Chinese miners are still killed every year.
19 IEA, Tracking clean energy progress, April 2013, p. 7.
20 According to EEA in its 2013 report, Trends and projections in Europe in 2013 – Tracking progress towards
Europe’s climate and energy targets until 2020 (p. 10), the EU is close to reaching its 20% GHG emission
reduction target by 2020. Even better, projections show that EU emissions (including emissions from inter-
national aviation) are expected to reach 21% below 1990 levels with the current set of national domestic
measures in place, and 24% if Member States implement the additional measures currently still at planning
stage.
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§ 2. THE GENESIS OF THE EU RENEWABLES POLICY
2.1. The 1997 White Paper as a starting point
In a 1997 White Paper,21 the EU set itself the non-binding target of generating 12%
of gross inland energy consumption from renewable sources by 2010. This target
represented a doubling of the 1997 contribution from renewable energies (5.8%).22
This policy was based on the need to address sustainability concerns surrounding
climate change and air pollution, improve the security of Europe’s energy supply and
develop Europe’s competitiveness and industrial and technological innovation.
The White Paper also contained a comprehensive strategy and an action plan. A key
element of the action plan was the establishment of a European legislation to
provide a stable policy framework and clarify the expected development of renew-
able energy in each Member State. As a result, two key pieces of legislation were
later adopted: Directives 2001/77/EC23 on the promotion of electricity from renew-
able sources in the internal electricity market, and 2003/30/EC24 on the promotion
of the use of biofuels or other renewable fuels for transport. They set indicative 2010
targets for all Member States, and required action to improve the growth, develop-
ment of and access to renewable energy. Another key element of the action plan
consisted of favourable fiscal and finance measures.
Additionally, in 2005 a Biomass Action Plan25 was adopted. Its aim was to potentially
bring down oil prices, reduce GHG emissions and create or protect jobs, often in rural
areas. The three sectors in which biomass use had to be prioritized were heat
production, electricity and transport. For transport, the Biomass Action Plan foresaw
the promotion of ‘biofuels obligations’ through which suppliers included a minimum
proportion of biofuels in the conventional fuel they placed on the market.
The Commission’s publication of reports26 in 2001 and 200427 evaluating the
progress made towards the 2010 target and the 2006 Renewable Energy Roadmap28
highlighted the slow, patchy and uneven progress Member States were making and
21 Communication from the Commission – Energy for the future: renewable sources of energy – White
Paper for a Community strategy and action plan (COM(97) 599). The Communication was welcomed by the
European Parliament in its Resolution of 17 June 1998 (A4-0199/98). In this Resolution, the European
Parliament considered the objective of 12% by 2010 to be a minimum.
22 In 1997, the share of RES in the total gross inland consumption of the EU amounted to 5.8% (COM(2001) 69,
p. 6).
23 OJ 2001, L 283/33.
24 OJ 2003, L 123/42.
25 COM(2005) 628.
26 COM(2001) 69, p. 28.
27 COM(2004) 366, p. 4.
28 COM(2006) 848. The Roadmap has been an integral part of the review of European energy policy which
took place in early 2007 (‘Energy Package’). It responded to the request made by the European Council in
March 2006 for further promotion of renewable energy sources in the long term.
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the likelihood that the EU as a whole would fail to reach its 2010 targets. The 2009
progress report once again confirmed this, and anticipated that only 9% of the 12%
would be met in 2010.29
2.2. The 2006 Energy Roadmap as a second step
The 2006 Energy Roadmap enumerated the difficulties faced in meeting the 2010 EU
and national targets as follows:
• the high cost of renewable energy owing to the investment required and the fact
that externalities (the ‘external cost of the different energy sources, particularly
their long-term impact on health or the environment’) had not been taken into
account, giving fossil fuels an artificial advantage;
• the administrative problems resulting from installation procedures and the
decentralized nature of most renewable energy applications;
• the opaque and/or discriminatory rules governing grid access;
• inadequate information for suppliers, customers and installers;
• the fact that the 12% target was expressed as a percentage of primary energy,
which put wind power at a disadvantage.
To these five explanations, the 2006 Energy Roadmap added a sixth: the non-binding
nature of the EU and national targets and the gaps in the EU legal framework for
renewable energy. Hence, as an objective for the future, the Energy Roadmap
proposed at EU level a mandatory target of generating 20% of gross inland energy
consumption from renewable sources by 2020. This overall EU target had to be
reflected in mandatory national targets. The precise way to achieve these national
targets had to be set out in National Action Plans. In addition, as biofuels are the only
form of renewable energy which can address the energy challenges of the transport
sector, the Roadmap proposed a legally binding minimum target for biofuels, to be
fixed at 10% of overall consumption of petrol and diesel in transport for 2020. To
ensure a smooth implementation of this biofuel target, the Roadmap also proposed,
in parallel, a modification of the Fuel Quality Directive (98/70/EC). It also proposed
the creation of a new and strengthened legislative framework to enhance the
promotion and use of renewable energy. This new framework had to provide the
business community with ‘certainty and stability’.
At its March 2007 summit, the European Council greenlit the binding targets,
which were integrated into the broader perspective of climate and energy.30 For
further action, it adopted a comprehensive energy action plan for the period
29 COM(2009) 192.
30 Presidency conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 8-9 March 2007 (Council document 7224/01/07
Rev. 1 of 2 May 2007).
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2007-200931. The binding character of the 10% biofuel target was subject to three
conditions: the sustainability of biofuel production, the commercial availability of
second-generation biofuels, and the consequent modification of the Fuel Quality
Directive (98/70/EC) to allow for adequate levels of blending. The European
Council also called for a review of the guidelines on state aid for environmental
protection and other relevant EU instruments which could provide incentives.
According to a 2008 Commission communication,32 the EU renewable energy target
of 20% had to bring about several advantages for the EU as a whole. It had to
• help the EU reduce GHG and reach a low emission economy, since renewable
energies are low-carbon energies;
• improve energy security by making the EU less dependent on imports of oil and
gas and, consequently, less exposed to rising and volatile energy prices;
• contribute to the Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs by creating an estimated
one million jobs in the sector; and
• help to save some €100 billion and cut emissions by almost 800 million tonnes a
year.
All this led to the adoption of Directive 2009/28/EC33 on the promotion of the use of
energy from renewable sources (also referred to as the RED). The RED is the key
instrument for increasing renewable energy production. It had to be transposed by
5 December 2010.
2.3. The 2009/28/EC Directive (or RED) as part of the climate and 
energy package
2.3.1. The general mandatory goals
The RED sets two mandatory goals: renewable energy should supply 20% of the EU’s
gross final consumption by 2020, and each EU country is required to significantly
increase the contribution of RES to its energy mix. A 10% share of renewable fuels
(primarily biofuels) in transport by 2020, part of the overall 20% renewable target, is
also fixed under the condition that for biofuels, indirect land-use considerations and
other sustainability criteria are taken into account.
It should be noted that the share of all RES at EU level amounted to 8.5% of the total
final energy consumption in 2005 (base year). To reach the fixed 20% target, the EU
31 Annex I to the Council conclusions contains the action plan (Council document 7224/1/07 Rev. 1 of 2 May
2007). This action plan is based on Commission communication An energy policy for Europe (COM(2007) 1).
32 See COM(2008) 30, pp. 2, 3, 4 and 8 in fine.
33 Directive 2009/28/EC of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and
amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (OJ 2009, L 140/16). The
initial legislative proposal can be found under reference COM(2008) 19 final.
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needs necessarily to make an effort of +11.5%. This requires significant infrastructure
investments. According to the European authorities at the time, however, such
investment costs should fall as other energy producers face the costs of EU Emissions
Trading System (ETS) allowances and rising prices for oil and gas.34 As everyone now
knows, this is not what happened.
2.3.2. The distribution of the overall 20% target among Member 
States
To achieve the 20% goal by 2020, the RED establishes binding renewable energy
targets for each EU Member State. Each national renewable energy target is
different, with some national targets higher than 20% and some lower.
To ensure that their individual national binding targets are reached by 2020, Member
States are also given an ‘indicative trajectory’. This provides interim targets to be
reached every two years until 2020. By 2011-2012, the Member States should be
20% of the way towards the target (compared to 2005); by 2013-2014, 30%; by 2015-
2016, 45%; and by 2017-18, 65%.
In terms of electricity consumption, at the EU level, this means that renewable
sources should provide about 35% of the EU’s power by 2020.
34 See Commission communication COM (2008) 30, p. 7.
National overall targets for the share of energy from renewable sources in final consumption 
of energy in 2020 (Annex I, point A of the Directive)
EU Countries Share of energy from 
renewable sources in final 
consumption of energy, 
2005 (S2005)
Target for share of energy 
from renewable sources in 
final consumption of 
energy, 2020 (S2020)
Belgium 2.2% 13%
Bulgaria 9.4% 16%
Czech Republic 6.1% 13%
Denmark 17% 30%
Germany 5.8% 18%
Estonia 18% 25%
Ireland 3.1% 16%
Greece 6.9% 18%
Spain 8.7% 20%
France 10.3% 23%
Italy 5.2% 17%
Cyprus 2.9% 13%
Latvia 34.9% 42%
Lithuania 15.0% 23%
Luxemburg 0.9% 11%
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AND:
2.3.3. The sectors concerned
In the RED, three sectors are concerned with the growth of renewable energy
sources: (a) electricity, (b) heating and cooling, and (c) transport.
For the first two sectors, Member States have independently fixed the specific
sectoral targets that they want to achieve by 2020. For the third sector – transport –
they had no choice. They have to achieve a minimum of 10% of transport fuel from
RES.
2.3.4. The national renewable energy action plans and monitoring
Each Member State had to submit a national renewable energy action plan to the
Commission before 30 June 2010, prepared in accordance with the template
published by the Commission. This action plan provides a detailed roadmap of how
the Member State expects to reach its binding 2020 target for the share of renewable
energy in its final energy consumption. It contains the sectoral targets chosen, the
technology mix it expects to use, the trajectory it will follow and the measures and
reforms it will undertake to overcome barriers to developing renewable energy.
Hungary 4.3% 13%
Malta 0.0% 10%
Netherlands 2.4% 14%
Austria 23.3% 34%
Poland 7.2% 15%
Portugal 20.5% 31%
Romania 17.8% 24%
Slovenia 16.0% 25%
Slovak Republic 6.7% 14%
Finland 28.5% 38%
Sweden 39.8% 49%
United Kingdom 1.03% 15%
Croatiaa
a. Croatia became the 28th Member State only on 1 July 2013.
13.2% (base year 2004) 20%
National overall targets for the share of energy from renewable sources in final consumption 
of energy in 2020 (Annex I, point A of the Directive) (Continued)
EU Countries Share of energy from 
renewable sources in final 
consumption of energy, 
2005 (S2005)
Target for share of energy 
from renewable sources in 
final consumption of 
energy, 2020 (S2020)
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Member States must provide the European Commission with a regular progress
report containing information on their share of renewable energy, support schemes
and progress in tackling barriers.
If a Member State fails to reach an intermediate target (cf. point 2.3.2.), it must
communicate to the Commission a modified renewable energy action plan that will
return it to the indicative trajectory within a reasonable timetable. The Commission
evaluates then it and may issue a recommendation.
2.3.5. Further essential elements of the regime governing the 
sectors concerned
The RED also requires the simplification of the administrative regimes faced by
renewable energy, together with improvements to the electricity grid, to increase
access for electricity from renewable sources.
Finally, the RED includes different mechanisms that Member States can apply to
achieve their targets, such as support schemes, statistical transfer, guarantees of
origin, joint projects between Member States (and with non-EU States), as well as
rules on preferential grid access for electricity from RES, and sustainability criteria for
biofuels and bioliquids.
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§ 3. THE 2014 EU SITUATION
3.1. Inland energy consumption until 2012 in the EU-28
Countries use different accounting methods to estimate the share of renewables in
their total energy consumption. The EU and its Member States estimate their renew-
able energy share based on gross final energy consumption.
Over the last two decades, gross inland energy consumption in the EU-28, which
stood at 1,670 million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in 1990, rose to a peak of 1,830
Mtoe in 2006 and then decreased to 1,680 Mtoe in 2012. This means that between
2006 and 2012, gross inland energy consumption in the EU-28 fell by 8%.35 This is due
to a combination of several factors, including structural changes in the economy of
the EU, the economic crisis and efficiency improvements.36
The five largest energy consumers in 2012 were Germany, France, the United
Kingdom, Italy and Spain. Together these five Member States accounted for 64% of
total EU-28 energy consumption and for 77% of the reduction in absolute terms
between 2006 and 2012.
3.2. Progress in the EU-28 towards the 20% renewable energy 
target until 2012 in gross final energy consumption
3.2.1. Progress in all sectors of activity combined
The European Commission assessed Member States’ progress towards achieving
their national targets in 201137 and 201338 and these assessments were updated by
a March 2014 Eurostat.39
Eurostat shows that since the adoption of the RED, renewable energy consumption
has grown. Despite the fact that the situation is full of contrasts across the Member
States, energy from renewable sources was estimated to have contributed 14.1% of
gross final energy consumption in the EU-28 in 2012 (compared to 13% in 2011,
12.5% in 2010, 10% in 2007, 8.5% in 2005, and 8.3% in 2004).
In the electricity sector, the RES growth has been strong. The share of EU-produced
renewable electricity increased from 15% in 2005 to 23.5-24.1%40 in 2012. Addition-
35 Eurostat, Energy – 2012 data (STAT /14/25 of 17 February 2014).
36 SWD(2014) 330 final/3, p. 18.
37 COM(2011) 31.
38 COM(2013) 175.
39 See Eurosat news release on renewable energy in the EU-28 of 10 March 2014 (doc. STAT/14/37). Monthly
and annual energy data collections are governed by Regulation (EC) No 1099/2008 on energy statistics (OJ
2008, L 304/1).
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ally, in this sector, ‘renewables represented the majority of new electric generating
capacity for several consecutive years.’41
In the heating and transport sectors, reliance on imported fossil fuels remains high in
most Member States, where the use of renewables since 2005 has increased very
little.42 The RES share in the heating sector in 2012 was about 16%. In transport, the
current 5% of renewable energy share is largely based (above 95%) on first-genera-
tion biofuel use, 70% of which on average is produced in the EU, while the remaining
share is mainly sourced from Brazil, the United States and South East Asian coun-
tries.43
The level of 14.1% mentioned above means that the EU has therefore met its indic-
ative target for 2011-2012 and as a whole is on track to meet the 20% of renewable
energy for its gross final consumption in 2020. It is only 5.9 points short of the target
that it set itself for 2020.
However, the positive picture produced in a context of lower gross final energy
consumption (cf. point 3.1.), is not as good as one might think, for the following
reasons.
Firstly, from 2004 till 2012, only half the total was achieved. Moreover, if renewable
energy consumption increased till 2012, the indicative renewable energy trajectory
indicated in the RED – which remains to be achieved – grows steeper. This means
that one cannot continue at the same pace. To reach the 2020 target of 20% of RES
in its gross final consumption, the EU needs to almost double the growth already
achieved.44 Consequently, those Member States which have not reached their indi-
vidual target will need to make additional efforts in the forthcoming years in order to
reach it.45 An Ecofys report published in 2012 seems to agree with this analysis.46
Secondly, between 2011 and 2012, investments in renewable energy projects
contracted markedly, with the result that the new production capacities funded by
these investments in the coming years will be lower than expected. Yet it is the
40 Combined reading of EU energy in figures – Statistical Pocketbook 2014, p. 121 as well as Commission’s
document SWD(2014) 330 final/3, pp. 82 and 90. See also Eurostat’s table, updated in 2014 (http://
epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tsdcc330&plugin=1).
41 REN21, Renewables Global Status Report 2014, 2014, p. 14.
42 This weak result could originate in the rather feeble support measures provided by Member States for
renewable energy heating and cooling. See SWD(2014) 330 final/3, p. 164.
43 SWD(2014) 330 final/3, p. 163.
44 See Trends and projections in Europe 2013 – Tracking progress towards Europe’s climate and energy targets
until 2020, EEA, pp. 11 and 114-118.
45 Only three Member States (Bulgaria, Estonia and Sweden) have so far achieved their respective binding
renewable energy target. Estonia did it in 2011. Bulgaria and Sweden in 2012. Several other Member States
are well on track to achieve their individual renewable energy target (in particular, Lithuania, Romania,
Czech Republic, Austria). The lowest share of renewable sources in gross final consumption is found in
Malta, Luxembourg, United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Though Germany is the largest producer of
renewable energy, it has not yet reached its individual renewable energy target in its gross final energy
consumption. See a confirmation in the EU 2014 Statistical Pocketbook, p. 27.
46 Renewable energy: A 2030 scenario for the EU, 2012, p. 8.
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investments being made now that will enable the EU 2020 target to be met.47 ‘The
second consecutive year of decline in investment – after several years of growth –
was due in part to uncertainty over incentive policies in Europe ... and to retroactive
reductions in support in some countries. Europe’s renewable energy investment was
down 44% from 2012.’48
Problems are particularly acute in the electricity sector, which has so far contributed
the most to the development of RES, especially with the rapid expansion of wind
energy and photovoltaic generation.
Therefore, the threat of not reaching the EU renewable energy 2020 target remains
plausible. This is bad news when one knows that according to the EU Reference
Scenario 2013, fossil fuel import prices are projected to increase by 50% or more in
the period 2010-2030, most notably between 2010 and 2020.49
3.2.2. Additional data on the electricity sector
A. Stagnation of the electricity demand
Electricity consumption steadily grew until 2008. This growth was due to the general
increase in economic activities across the EU, which resulted in growing demand for
power.50
However, in 2012 electricity demand remained at about 4% (112 TWh) below the
peak reached in 2008.51 Moreover, in 2012 demand stagnated at the 2011 level.52
This overall picture of stabilization conceals, however, contrasting developments in
the different Member States. Some Member States experienced a growth in
demand. Some experienced a decline in demand, while others reported stagnation.
So there are large divergences across countries concerning electricity demand.
In the 2013 Reference Scenario, electricity demand within the EU is, however, esti-
mated to grow until 2020 at an annual growth rate of 0.5% per year. After 2020, the
electricity demand growth rate would increase to nearly 1% per year. Demand evolu-
tion patterns are expected to be highly divergent across countries in Europe.53
47 The State of Renewable Energies in Europe, 13th EurObserv’ER report, 2013, p. 7.
48 REN21, Renewables Global Status Report 2014, 2014, p. 17.
49 Commission’s document SWD(2014) 15 final, pp. 24 and 26.
50 SWD(2014) 330 final/3, p.88.
51 Dominique Auverlot, Etienne Beeker, Gaëlle Hossie, Louise Oriol, Aude Rigard-Cerison, The crisis of the
European electricity system – Diagnosis and possible ways forward, Commissariat général à la stratégie et à
la prospective, January 2014, p. 21.
52 Power statistics and trends 2013, Eurelectric, December 2013, pp. 4 and 10.
53 Power statistics and trends 2013, Eurelectric, December 2013, pp. 10-11. See also SWD(2014) 330 final/3, p.
13.
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B. Increase of electricity generation from RES
As already stated, in 2012 in Europe, electricity generation from RES amounted to
about 23.5%-24.1% (compared to 15% in 2005).54 Of these, a growing share comes
from intermittent generation such as solar and wind power. In 2012, both have
provided the most input to renewable production, after hydropower.55 Indeed
hydropower accounted in 2012 for 46% of renewable electricity generation in the
EU, wind and solar power for 35%, biomass for 18%.
Both wind and solar have also emerged as alternatives to conventional fossil fuels
and nuclear power, although it is important to note that due to their intermittent
nature, back-up generation capacities need to be assured to maintain an adequate
power supply to the grid. As the share of solar and wind grows, however, further
modernization of the grid and system operations becomes more necessary to ensure
the electricity supply continues to be reliable.56
According to National Renewable Energy Action Plans’ (NREAP) technology projec-
tions concerning the electricity sector, by 2020 wind would become the most impor-
tant RES, providing 40% of all renewable electricity. The contribution of photovoltaic
and solar-thermal electricity would also grow while the contribution of biomass is
expected to remain almost unchanged and the role of hydropower would decrease.
The role of geothermal, wave and tidal are still expected to remain marginal in
2020.57 As a whole, following NREAP projections, renewable electricity will represent
about 34% of electricity production in 2020.58 Industry expectations seem higher. In
its 2011 roadmap, it has estimated that renewable electricity could reach 42% in
2020.59
C. Increase of RES capacities at a slower pace
RES capacities continued to increase in 2012. That year, RES capacities increased at
a rate of 11%. By comparison with 2011, this growth rate is less important. In 2011 it
amounted to 15%. This slowdown is expected to continue due to regulatory changes,
notably in national RES support policies.
One needs to be careful with the numbers, however. For example, ‘new investment
in renewable energy excluding large hydro-electric projects slipped 14% in 2013 to
$214 billion, but even this disguised one major positive development. One of the two
54 ‘Combined reading of EU energy in figures’ in Statistical Pocketbook 2014, p. 121 as well as Commission’s
document SWD(2014) 330 final/3, pp. 82 and 90. See also Eurostat’s table, updated in 2014 (http://
epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tsdcc330&plugin=1).
55 ‘EU energy in figures’ in Statistical Pocketbook 2014, p. 91 as well as SWD(2014) 330 final/3, p. 90.
56 SWD(2014) 330 final/3, pp. 10-11.
57 SWD(2014) 330 final/3, p. 99.
58 SWD(2014) 259 final, p. 32.
59 SWD(2014) 330 final/3, p. 100.
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main reasons for this fall in 2013 was a reduction in costs in photovoltaics – even as
the dollar investment in solar went down, the number of gigawatts of photovoltaic
systems added went up.’60
3.3. The improved competitiveness of solar and wind electricity
One essential, and quite positive, evolution in this domain comes from the rapidly
growing competitiveness of wind, and, even more so, solar energy. According to an
instructive 2014 report from Ernst & Young,
‘some more recent studies suggest that investment cost estimates made in
2011 by the European Commission and ECF [European Climate Foundation]
for renewable energy generation equipment, grids and storage, were overes-
timated. A recent analysis for Germany shows that on the distribution level,
the total cost for grid expansion can be as low as €3 billion: just 10% of earlier
estimates. Also, for instance, new storage capacity is found not to be needed
in Germany before a share of 60%-80% of renewables is reached. Estimates of
system costs such as balancing requirements and back-up capacity resulting
from the integration of large shares of renewables are also subject to uncer-
tainty. The specific functionalities of some systems are already integrated in
modern technologies, as for example in the case of [photovoltaic] where
inverters can now provide reactive power provision or storage. In addition,
balancing occurs at the level of an overall power system, and partly depends
on the system’s interconnection capacity and gate closure time – both factors
which are unrelated to the share of renewables. Besides these evolutions in
understanding of system requirements, the costs of renewable energy tech-
nologies themselves have evolved over the last two years. Several renewable
energy solutions have accelerated their cost reduction trajectory beyond
expectations, thus making the renewable energy pathway more attractive for
Europe. This cost reduction has been so significant that the cost level for
[photovoltaic] that was expected for 2050 in the ECF Roadmap 2050 has
already been reached.’61
However, it must be remembered that renewable electricity’s competitiveness does
not depend exclusively on this. Wind and solar electricity are by definition irregular
and unpredictable. They thus require stability instruments, which must be paid for.
They also require more powerful and efficient networks. And be paid for. These addi-
tional costs must also be taken into consideration in the general analysis.62
60 FS-UNEP Collaborating Centre, Global trends in renewable energy investment 2014, p. 18.
61 Ernst & Young, Macro-economic impacts of the low carbon transition, 2014, p. 34.
62 See the excellent analysis of M. Cruciani, Le coût des énergies renouvelables, (Institut Français des Relations
Internationales or IFRI), 2014.
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§ 4. THE MAIN CHALLENGES ENTAILED BY THE 
GROWING SHARE OF WIND AND SOLAR 
POWER IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR
Renewables – in particular wind and solar power – have penetrated the electricity
sector faster than other sectors. This is in line with the EU’s overall strategy of first
decarbonizing its electricity supply, and then further electrifying the wider economy.
Wind and solar power face challenges that can make their future deployment slower
than expected, and drive the 20% target further out of reach.
4.1. Changes in the merit order
With the development of wind and solar power, the functioning of the merit order
has been disrupted.
As in almost any market, electricity market operators rank power plants based on
their cost of producing an incremental amount of electricity. They then start by using
the lowest-cost power plants first, and then move up the list (the supply curve) until
they have enough electricity to meet demand. The power plant rank order is based
on the cost of producing an incremental amount of electricity, so only fuel costs and
variable operational and maintenance costs are considered. As a result, wind and
solar energy resources are always used first (regardless of the existence of a priority
dispatch) as they are free fuels. Because of that, they displace the output of the most
expensive and least efficient power plants that otherwise would have operated.63 In
other words, the continuous addition of intermittent energy significantly reduces
fossil fuel costs (as well as pollution), but on a basis which cannot be anticipated
thanks to weather fluctuations.
In the EU, the zero-fuel costs of wind and solar power have had an impact on the
wholesale market price. The wholesale price for all electricity purchasers is set by the
last – and therefore most expensive power plant – in the merit order. By offsetting
the most expensive operational power plants, wind and solar energy typically cause
the electricity price to be set by a more efficient and less expensive power plant than
it otherwise would be. The result is lower wholesale market prices for purchasers.
For example, the wholesale price in France decreased by 12% between 2012 and
2013, and decreased further at the beginning of 2014.64
63 See M. Goggin, The facts about wind energy’s impacts on electricity markets: Cutting through Exelon’s
claims about ‘negative prices’ and ‘market distortion’, AWEA, March 2014, p. 6.
64 Conseil Français de l’énergie, 3rd European Energy Forum – What policy measures for energy transition in
Europe?, Paris, 24-25 April 2014, p. 41.
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4.2. Overcapacity in the electricity system
The increase of solar and wind capacities (whose output is dispatched first and is
produced at zero-fuel cost, thus upsetting the merit order) coupled with the stagna-
tion of electricity demand put a ‘squeeze’ on conventional electricity generation.
During 2008 and 2012, renewable production increased by 176 TWh, with the result
that demand for conventional production has dropped by 288 TWh.65
This situation has led to overcapacity in the electricity system, as the number of full-
load hours of operation for conventional power plants has fallen (in particular, gas-
fired power plants but also hard-coal power plants). It has become a difficult situa-
tion for established utilities. Since 2000, they have overinvested in generating
capacity from fossil fuels, and the economic viability of their existing conventional
back-up plants is now threatened. This situation is compounded by the fact that
wholesale market prices have fallen, and if the wholesale market prices fall, so does
the profitability of conventional power plants.
As a result, conventional power generators are currently discouraged from investing
in conventional power plants (notably to replace the old inefficient and polluting
units) which might suffer from low utilization – or might not even be used once built
– while the increased need for flexible back-up units to cover a growing intermittent
generation from RES remains. If this issue is not addressed, then in an apparent
contradiction, the current overcapacity of conventional power plants could become
undercapacity in the future, especially if older plants are dismantled.
In some Member States, this evolution has raised the question of how to ensure
adequate investment signals and generation adequacy. As a solution,66 some states
are considering new public intervention such as support schemes for investments in
new electricity generation capacity or for remunerating existing plants to keep them
operational. The Commission considers that such measures should not result in inef-
ficient plants being artificially kept in operation through public support, or in unnec-
essary new generation capacity being built. So to ensure this does not happen, it has
issued a communication offering guidelines.67 One can also now see the emergence
in some Member States of ‘strategic reserve’ or ‘capacity markets’.68
65 Dominique Auverlot, Etienne Beeker, Gaëlle Hossie, Louise Oriol, Aude Rigard-Cerison, The crisis of the
European electricity system – Diagnosis and possible ways forward, Commissariat général à la stratégie et à
la prospective, January 2014, p. 21.
66 See on this issue notably M.-O. Bettzüge, D. Helm and F. Roques, The crisis of the European electricity
system – Diagnosis and possible ways forward, Commissariat Général à la stratégie et à la prospective,
Rapports & Documents, January 2014, p. 71.
67 Commission communication Delivering the internal electricity market and making the most of public inter-
vention – C(2013) 7243 final.
68 See on the subject: EI Fact Sheet 2013-03, Capacity Mechanisms, KU Leuven Energy Institute.
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4.3. More frequent occurrence of negative electricity prices in 
power exchanges due to an insufficiently flexible power 
plant fleet
The profitability of conventional power plants is also damaged by another phenom-
enon: negative prices. A negative price is a price which falls below zero. It indicates
that power generators are willing to pay the consumer to take electricity off their
hands.
The occurrence of negative electricity prices on wholesale markets is more and more
frequent, especially in certain Member States. It is due to the simultaneous presence
of two elements: (a) abundant green electricity generation characterized by zero-
fuel costs (such as wind and solar power generation) and (b) a low demand. They are
more likely to emerge where the generating fleet as a whole is not flexible enough
(too many nuclear and coal-fuelled plants or too little flexibility such as Combined
Cycle Gas Turbines (CCGTs) or turbo-gas power plants, or insufficient grid intercon-
nections).69 According to a 2014 American Wind Energy Association (AWEA) report,
localized transmission outages alone can also be responsible for negative price
occurrences.70
These negative prices are the consequence of opportunity costs – i.e., it is less costly
to operate the plant at even negative prices for a very limited period of time than to
reduce the plant’s output. This allows the plant operator to prepare for the expected
increase of demand and/or market conditions bringing/promising higher prices.
However, with the continuous increase of renewable energy such as wind and solar
power, the opportunity to compensate negative prices will vanish because the risk in
remaining operational will become too high. The only option remaining will be to
shut down the plant.71 To illustrate, and as the EU Commission’s DG Energy stated in
its most recent quarterly report:72 ‘On a Sunday afternoon in mid-June wind and
solar assured more than 60% of power generation in Germany, resulting in negative
hourly prices in the whole CWE region…’
There are still many power exchanges, both within and outside the EU, that do not
allow negative prices on their power exchanges. To date, in the EU, negative power
prices have been allowed in the countries covered by the European Power Exchange
(EPEX), i.e., France, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, as well as in Belgium and the
Netherlands.
69 See the article by Simona Benedettini and Carlo Stagnaro published in the Energy Post on 27 May 2014 and
entitled: ‘The case for allowing negative electricity prices’ (http://www.energypost.eu/case-allowing-nega-
tive-electricity-prices/).
70 Michael Goggin, The fact about wind energy’s impacts on electricity markets: cutting through Exelon’s
claims about ‘negative prices’ and ‘market distortion’, American Wind Energy Association or AWEA, March
2014, p. 4.
71 Flexible Generation: backing up renewables, Eurelectric, October 2011, p. 35.
72 EU Quarterly Report on European electricity markets. Market observatory for energy. DG Energy, vol. 6,
issue 2, second quarter 2013, p. 1.
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4.4. The failure of the EU ETS carbon price effect
A switch from fossil fuels to renewables in the electricity sector is feasible in response
to carbon price signals. The EU ETS has produced these carbon price signals by
covering about 11,000 installations, but not as expected. To help incentivize the
development of renewables and have a substantial impact, these EU ETS carbon
price signals need to stay above a certain level (€30-40 as initially forecast by the
European Commission). But the levels experienced by the EU ETS carbon price signals
over the last few years are significantly beneath that threshold. They have remained
well under €10 and sometimes not far from around €3. It is thus a long way from the
price range initially forecast by the European Commission.
These repeatedly weak EU ETS price signals come from the emergence of a surplus
of around two billion CO2 allowances (2012 figures). Several causes explain such a
surplus: (a) the GHG target for 2020 was set too low; (b) the economic crisis resulted
in GHG emissions well below the total EU cap of GHG emissions allowed (although
this EU cap is already accompanied by a linear reduction factor of 1.74% per year);
(c) the widespread use of international credits allowed under the ETS since 2008; and
(d) the RES and energy efficiency policies which contribute to reducing CO2 emissions
in the ETS sectors, in particular in the power sector.
As a result, the consistently weak level of the EU ETS price signal has not been able
to significantly affect the price of fossil-fuelled power generation and thus to offset
the externalities generated (like, for instance, carbon emissions, air pollution, etc.).
As a consequence, mitigation costs are increasing, as no correct carbon price signal
is available. This situation also impedes the correct evaluation of nuclear or Carbon
Capture of Storage (CCS) benefits.73 If the problem remains unaddressed it will have
a long-lasting effect on the ability of the ETS to provide an incentive to invest in low-
carbon energy technologies such as renewables.
4.5. The perverse encouragement of coal
The combination of reduced demand, low wholesale prices and sub-utilization of
conventional power plants that reduced profitability, as well as increasingly subsi-
dized RES, has pushed expensive gas out of the market. This impact on gas has been
further exacerbated by the fall in coal prices and the inability of the EU ETS carbon
price to bridge the gap.
73 See also T. Spencer, M. Colombier and T. Ribera, Issues and options with regard to the renewables target in
the context of the 2030 EU climate and energy package, Institute for Sustainable Development and Interna-
tional Relations or IDDRI Policy brief 04/14, 2014, pp. 7-11.
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As a result, the EU appears to have shifted from RES plus gas to RES plus coal, and
also from nuclear to coal (following the German nuclear decision). To illustrate, from
2011 to 2012, coal-fired generation grew by 13% while gas-fired generation dropped
by 23%. Nuclear generation also declined by 2.8%. It is also obvious that coal-fired
generation ensured better profitability than gas-fired generation both in Germany
and in the United Kingdom in 2012 and 2013.74 The consequence was a rise in CO2
emissions.75
Moreover, some Member States have resorted to measures such as priority dispatch
for electricity generated from domestic coal or peat, including Spain, Slovakia,
Ireland and Estonia. This may lead to distortions of the markets, go against climate
objectives and pose challenges with state aid rules.76
4.6. High variability and instability of public support in Member 
States
Each Member State has discretion to decide what policies and incentives are offered
to stimulate investment in and development of renewable electricity projects. In
recent years, they have overhauled these on multiple occasions. Notably, numerous
Member States have either suspended/ended their support for RES or have made
policy decisions to retroactively reduce financial incentives for renewable electricity
projects based on wind and solar power. This was done for several reasons: the diffi-
cult financial situations in these Member States; the substantial technology cost
reductions; over-subsidization and changing market circumstances.77 Needless to
say, such measures have destroyed investor confidence, in particular in the solar
sector.78 They have contributed to the reduced investments levels experienced in
2012 and 2013.79 And, by introducing them, EU Member States make it thus more
difficult for themselves to meet the 2020 renewable energy targets.
Moreover, with the exception of Sweden and Norway, none of the cooperation
mechanisms provided for in the RED have been made use of, and national support
schemes are restricted to national production in the absence of these cooperation
74 SWD(2014) 330 final/3, p. 91.
75 On this issue, see K. Gutmann (Climate Action Network), J. Huscher (Health and Environment Alliance), D.
Urbaniak and A. White (Worldwide Fund for Nature), C. Schaible (European Environmental Bureau), and M.
Bricke (Climate Alliance Germany), Europe’s dirty 30 – How the EU’s coal-fired power plants are under-
mining its climate efforts, July 2014.
76 SWD(2014) 330 final/3, p.159.
77 Phillip Brown, European Union wind and solar electricity policies: overview and considerations, Congres-
sional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, 7 August 2013, p. 37.
78 See European Photovoltaic Industry Association report on the retrospective measures at national level and
their impact on the photovoltaic sector, December 2013 (http://www.epia.org/fileadmin/user_upload/
Press_Releases/Restrospective_Measures_at_national_level.pdf) To understand better the evolution, see
also a 2007 report made for Intelligent Energy Europe by G. Resch, T. Faber, R. Haas, C. Huber et al., Assess-
ment and optimization of renewable energy support schemes in the European electricity market (http://
ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/studies/doc/renewables/2007_02_optres.pdf).
79 SWD(2014) 15 final, op. cit., p.19.
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mechanisms.80 This hinders the convergence of national support schemes method-
ologies across the EU which could help contribute to the optimization of investment
decisions. This situation presents a further challenge to cost-efficient deployment of
renewable energy and works against market integration.81
Clearly, experience has taught us that
‘stronger Europeanisation in the renewable energy field will help markets
with stable investment frameworks to lend some of their credibility to partner
countries. The more countries that pursue similar schemes, the larger the
common market that will be established. Smaller countries in particular may
benefit from more visibility, allowing them to attract additional competitors
in a larger scheme for project planning, development and financing.’82
4.7. Obstacles to new and improved infrastructures
The rapid development of renewables and their increased competitiveness have
increased the need to facilitate the building of new infrastructures, including both
generation projects and networks. However, many administrative burdens and
various obstacles remain. Administrative procedures are still complex. Only three
countries (Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands) benefit from a single permit system
for building renewable generation projects. In addition, once built, renewable
projects often find it difficult to get the necessary connection to the low-voltage grid.
Grid connection problems for renewables occur within a Member State and thus the
new EU regulation on infrastructure, aimed at transnational connections, does not
help much.83
80 See ECJ, 1 July 2014, Ålands Vindkraft AB vs Energimyndigheten, C-573/12. This case was brought by Ålands
Vindkraft, which operates a wind farm in the Åland archipelago, in Finland. It supplied electricity to Swedish
companies and sought to benefit from Swedish subsidies for renewable energy. When Sweden refused its
request, it filed a complaint at a Swedish court, which referred the case to the ECJ. The case raised the
question of whether national support schemes can discriminate against producers from other Member
States and whether that is an unjustifiable barrier to the free movement of goods. In its judgment, the ECJ
confirmed that subsidies that are made available only to national renewable energy producers are justified
by the public interest in protecting the environment and combatting climate change. According to the ECJ,
the RED permits, but does not require, the possibility of extending national support systems beyond
national borders. Only via an international agreement, in the form of a cooperation mechanism provided
for under the RED, could a Member State recognize green energy produced in another Member State.
Some commenters believe that this judgment has compounded the uncertainties about the balance
between environmental imperatives and the free movement of electricity. See E. Durand and M. Keay,
National support for renewable electricity and the single market in Europe, The Oxford Institute for Energy
Studies, August 2014, p. 7.
81 SWD(2014) 15 final, op. cit., p.19. On cooperation mechanisms, see also the report written by C. Klessmann,
E. de Visser, F. Wingand, Malte Gephart, G. Resch and S. Busch et al., Cooperation between EU Member
States under the RES Directive, 29 January 2014.
82 S. Müller-Kraenner and S. Langsdorf, A European Union for Renewable Energy – Policy Options for Better
Grids and Support Schemes, Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2012, p. 32.
83 D. Buchan, Why Europe’s energy and climate policies are coming apart, The Oxford Institute for Energy
Studies, SP 28, July 2013, p. 13.
RENEWABLES: THE GREAT UNCERTAINTY OF THE EU ENERGY STRATEGY
31
For wind in particular, the main challenges remain the grid connection of offshore
wind farms and the grid extension of transmission lines to transport the power to
where it is needed. Higher interconnection between EU Member States is also
considered fundamental for the better management of variable output power from
renewables. It would help reduce the need (and thus costs) of back-up capacity and
system-stabilizing services. It would also help moderate electricity prices.
4.8. Support for renewables affects retail prices
The speed of solar and wind development was not predicted by observers or public
authorities.
To finance the costs of renewable electricity subsidization, lawmakers in numerous
EU Member States have imposed on electricity consumers ever increasing taxes or
levies which add to their electricity bill. In other words, renewable support schemes
have begun to have a bigger impact on electricity prices than even reasonably high
carbon prices could have.
The retail price of electricity is composed of three elements: (a) the energy cost
element, (b) the network costs element and (c) the tax/levy element. The energy cost
element is still the largest portion of the price in most Member States. However, of
the three elements just mentioned, the share of the tax/levy element has seen the
greatest increase since 2008.
As a result, retail electricity prices for households and many businesses have
continued to rise to such an extent that electricity prices have become a political
battlefield.
Vulnerable households now encounter difficulties in paying their electricity bills, or
even cannot pay them, creating what is called ‘energy poverty’.
Businesses, particularly in energy-intensive industries exposed to international
competition, complain about competitiveness concerns,84 although they have
managed to obtain in a number of Member States tax and levy exemptions/reduc-
tions, which substantially mitigate tax/levy price rises.85 Such exemptions/reduc-
tions, considered as state aids, have given rise to concerns from stakeholders
84 On this issue, see O. Sartor, M. Colombier, and T. Spencer (IDDRI), Addressing industrial competitiveness
concerns in the 2030 EU climate and Energy Package, Policy Brief N° 03/14 January 2014.
85 At present exchange rates, EU industrial electricity prices (before taking account of tax or levy exemptions
for energy-intensive industries) are more than twice those in the United States and Russia, 20% higher than
China’s but 20% lower than those in Japan. See European Commission’s MEMO/14/38 of 22 January 2014.
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about distortions of competition across Member States.86 The Commission is
preparing an in-depth study to gather consistent and complete data on these tax
exemptions.87
These factors explain why households and businesses are now more and more reluc-
tant to pay the costs for the development of wind and solar energy. This situation is
compounded by the fact that in several Member States (like Germany), the cuts in
wholesale electricity prices thanks to the progression of renewable energy are not
passed on to final electricity consumers88 in the form of a reduction of the energy
cost element (furthermore, electro-intensive corporations tend to pay wholesale
power prices, so the burden of the cost has fallen more onto households than indus-
trial purchasers).89 It is also compounded by the fact that in certain Member States
(for instance, Germany again), despite important renewable subsidies, CO2 emis-
sions continue to increase.
An on-going study by the European Commission indicates that total expenditure on
renewable support in the EU was €13.7 billion in 2009, €18.6 billion in 2010, €30.1
billion in 2011 and €34.6 billion in 2012, but trends vary across Member States and
some costs are not reflected in the electricity bills but covered by public budgets, in
particular in countries with strong elements of price regulation. On the other hand,
the money saved by not importing additional non-renewable fuel was estimated to
amount to around €30 billion in 2010.90
In conclusion, the experiences of recent years reflect different realities. Firstly, the
absence of a correct carbon price increases the need for subsidies for renewables.
86 On 18 December 2013, the European Commission opened an in-depth state aid investigation into the
German Renewable Energy Act (EEG 2012) (European Commission’s press release IP/13/1283 of 18
December 2013). In its preliminary assessment, the European Commission has come to the conclusion
that the EEG may have given unlawful advantages to energy-intensive companies in Germany. Following
an ECJ judgment (21 November 2013, Deutsche Lufthansa AG vs Flughafen Frankfurt-Hahn GmbH, C-284/
12), national courts, at the request of interested parties, may also order the recovery of the benefits
before the Commission releases its final decision, on the basis of the purely preliminary Commission
decision to open the state aid investigation. Similar rules in Austria are currently under review at the
General Court of the European Union (T-251/11) as Austria seeks to overturn a 2011 Commission deci-
sion that a partial exemption for energy-intensive companies from paying the full costs for renewables
energy amounted to illegal state aid. This said, on 18 December 2013, the European Commission
announced a formal investigation into the UK government’s planned nuclear agreement at Hinkley Point
(European Commission’s press release IP/13/1277 of 18 December 2013). On 27 March 2014, it also
opened an in-depth state aid investigation into a French scheme under which energy-intensive compa-
nies are exempted from surcharges intended to support renewable energies (CSPE) (European Commis-
sion press release IP/14/327 of 27 March 2014).
87 COM (2014) 21/2, pp. 6-9. It should be noted that the problem of competitiveness of intensive energy
industries is also addressed by the Commission via state aid guidelines allowing for compensation of CO2
costs included in the prices of electricity. See the Guidelines on certain state aid measures in the context of
the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme post-2012 (ETS Guidelines), OJ C 158, 05.06.2012,
p. 4. They include a list of sectors that can benefit from reductions.
88 According to the European Commission, it can be explained by the fact that competition between suppliers
is extremely limited. Regulated prices and passive consumers also reduce incentives for competition. See
European Commission’s MEMO/14/38 of 22 January 2014.
89 SWD(2014) 15 final, op. cit., p.19.
90 SWD(2014) 15 final, op. cit., p.19.
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Secondly, in such a context, subsidies may become permanent91. Thirdly, awarding
subsidies to renewable projects without price competition often increases costs for
consumers.
91 See M. Kalkuhl, O. Edenhofer, K. Lessmann (Postdam Institute for Climate Impact Research), Renewable
energy subsidies: Second-best policy or fatal aberration for mitigation?, Nota di Lavoro 48.2011, Fondazione
EnI Enrico Mattei, pp. 30.
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§ 5. THE PROPOSED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
FOR THE PERIOD 2020-2030
In 2011, different long-term scenarios were described in the Commission communi-
cation Energy Roadmap 2050.92 All scenarios suggest a share of renewables of
around 30% in gross final energy consumption in 2030 (and 55% in 2050) but at the
same time they also suggest that renewable energy growth may fall after 2020
without further EU intervention, due to the higher costs and barriers facing RES
compared to fossil fuels.
In 2012 the Commission issued the communication Renewable Energy: a major
player in the European Energy Market,93 supplemented by an impact assessment and
the Commission’s staff working documents.94 In this communication, the Commis-
sion offers guidance for a better functioning of the current framework for renewable
energy until 2020. It also underlines the need to adjust public intervention in order
to stimulate innovation, increasingly expose renewables to market prices, prevent
overcompensation, diminish the costs of support and ultimately end support. It also
gives some clarifications for the post 2020 regime, in view of ensuring that the neces-
sary investment is made.
This 2012 communication was followed by a 2013 Green Paper95 that launched a
broad public consultation to create a new framework for EU climate change and
energy policies beyond 2020, up until 2030. It questions policy options in the renew-
able energy sector in the light of the lessons drawn from the current framework,
notably asking whether targets should be binding and at which level (EU, Member
States, sectors and/or sub-sectors). The results of the consultation revealed mixed
views on the usefulness of including a new renewable energy target for the period
2020-2030 due to the significant undesirable impacts it has entailed.96 The European
Council of May 2013 welcomed the Green Paper and invited the Commission to come
forward with more concrete proposals.
92 COM(2011) 885/2.
93 COM (2012) 271.
94 SWD (2012) 149; SWD (2012) 163; and SWD (2012) 164.
95 COM (2013) 169.
96 The results of the consultation can be found on the following website: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/consul-
tations/doc/20130702_green_paper_2030_consulation_results.pdf. The full report presenting results of
the public consultation can also be found in Annex 7.5. to the Impact Assessement bearing reference
SWD(2014) 15 final, from p. 199.
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5.1. The debate about a new 2030 target
On 22 January 2014, this provoked the Commission’s new proposals, which were
intended to define a new climate/energy package for the period from 2020 to 2030.
These proposals provide a revised set of policy options. One essential element is a
change in EU renewable energy strategy. This new strategy would comprise two
main components.
First, renewable energy must continue to play a fundamental role but must be
exploited in a way which is, to the greatest extent possible, market driven. The new
guidelines on energy and environmental state aid for 2014-202097 initiate this
reshaping of EU energy policy.
Second, the share of renewable energy in the EU is increased to 27% by 2030 (by
comparison, the percentage previously proposed in the Energy Roadmap amounted
to 30% by 2030). This percentage of 27% would be binding on the EU but not on the
Member States individually, as is currently the case. Member States would, however,
undertake clear commitments with a view to delivering the EU-level target collec-
tively. These commitments would be reviewed as part of a new governance process
and, if necessary, they would be complemented by further EU action and instru-
ments to ensure delivery of the EU target.98
The establishment of this framework for 2020-2030 will be the energy policy agenda
for the new European Commission, encompassing a decision on the continuation or
not of today’s three-target architecture (renewables, CO2 reduction and energy effi-
ciency).99
To help, an Impact Assessment (IA)100 has been elaborated. It describes the EU Refer-
ence Scenario 2013 (baseline scenario),101 which provides projections of expected
developments under existing policies (including policies adopted by late spring 2012)
up to 2020, 2020-30 and 2030-50. It then focuses on the broad objectives of the 2030
framework and assesses different policy scenarios102. The latter are also compared
in the light of the EU Reference Scenario 2013.103
97 2014/C 200/01 (OJ C 200, 28 June 2014, p. 1). These Guidelines replace the Guidelines on state aid for envi-
ronmental protection adopted in 2008 (OJ 2008, C 82, 1 April 2008, p. 1).
98 Communication from the Commission on a policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020
to 2030 – COM(2014) 15 final.
99 T. Spencer, M. Colombier and T. Ribera (IDDRI), The 2030 EU climate and energy package: why and how?,
Policy Brief N° 16/13 December 2013; S. Fischer and O. Geden, Updating the EU’s energy and climate policy
– New targets for the post-2020 period, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, May 2013; S. Andoura and Stefan Bössner,
Quel nouveau paquet énergie-climat pour l’UE?, Notre Europe, Tribune, 13 March 2014.
100 SWD(2014) 15 final.
101 EU Energy, Transport and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trends to 2050: Reference Scenario 2013 (http://
ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/trends_2030/doc/trends_to_2050_update_2013.pdf). The EU Refer-
ence Scenario 2013 has been developed through modelling with PRIMES, GAINS and other related models,
and has benefited from the comments of Member States’ experts.
102 The policy scenarios are characterized according to whether they are based on reference conditions or on
enabling conditions – SWD(2014) 15 final, p. 39.
103 On this subject, see T. Spencer, M. Colombier, T. Ribera, Issues and options with regard to the renewables
target in the context of the 2030 EU climate and energy package, IDDRI, policy brief N° 04/14 January 2014.
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A technical analysis and comparison of the different scenarios exceeds the purpose
of this paper. The IA offers, however, a series of interesting general considerations
and evolutions with regard to the proposed RES target and the challenges raised in
this paper in the electricity sector. They are as follows:
5.2. Evolution of the overall RES target
In the EU Reference Scenario 2013, RES in gross final energy consumption should
account for 24% in 2030 and 29% in 2050.104 This said, consumption of RES grows in
2030 in most policy scenarios. The growth is naturally the strongest under scenarios
with explicit RES targets.105
5.3. Power generation and capacity requirements
In the Reference Scenario 2013, rising electricity demand, together with RES policies
and technological progress, bring about a restructuring of electricity generation in
favour of RES to the detriment of mainly solid fuels. In electricity generation, the
share of RES reaches almost 45% in 2030, and about 50% in 2050.
These changes in the structure of power generation have also brought about
profound changes to the capacity requirements, given that the strongly penetrating
RES have lower load factors (more generation capacity for a given amount of elec-
tricity generation) than, for instance, coal and nuclear plants. Consequently, the
share of RES in capacity is even higher than in generation. Net power generation
capacities dominated by RES are expected to account for 55% of capacity in 2030 and
62% in 2050.
This expansion of RES capacities throughout the projection period is mainly driven by
on-shore and off-shore wind as well as solar.
Following these changes in generation structure and despite growing electricity
production, power generation would further decarbonize. This means concretely
that the share of RES and nuclear combined in gross electricity generation would
increase from the current 49% to reach 58% in 2020, 66% in 2030 and 73% in 2050.
In addition, CCS would make some inroads in the long run, with a meagre share of
less than 1% until 2030 increasing however to 7% by 2050.106
104 EU Energy, Transport and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trends to 2050: Reference Scenario 2013, p. 31.
105 SWD(2014) 15 final, pp. 67-68.
106 SWD(2014) 15 final, pp. 147-149.
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5.4. Wholesale prices
The IA acknowledges that the increasing deployment of RES – mainly solar and wind
generation – has contributed to containing and even lowering electricity wholesale
prices in many markets by shifting the merit order curve and taking the place of part
of the generation produced by conventional thermal plants, which have higher
marginal cost of production.
In other words, the increasing deployment of RES has had a beneficial impact on the
operational costs of power generation costs, further weakening the link between
power prices and fossil fuels.107 To illustrate this, the IA shows that, parallel to an
increase in the share of renewable energy in power generation, wholesale power
prices have risen less than the prices of oil and gas – and until recently coal –
suggesting that the increased share of renewable electricity may have contributed to
lessening increases in prices.
5.5. Retail electricity prices
The IA acknowledges that the fall of wholesale prices has scarcely been reflected in
retail prices. It explains that this is partly due to insufficient competition and partly
due to the cost for renewables support schemes, whose burden has not been evenly
shared across consumer segments, with exemptions for some industries and a corre-
spondingly higher burden for households.108
In the Reference Scenario 2013, electricity prices are projected to increase signifi-
cantly, mainly until 2020, although they will remain relatively stable after 2020. From
a 2030 perspective, in the policy scenarios electricity price increases are similar to
those under the EU Reference Scenario.109
Although fossil fuel prices (projected to increase sharply in the run up to 2020110)
remain key drivers of electricity end-user prices, taxes and levies are projected to
remain a significant part of future electricity end-user prices. However, their share is
expected to stay roughly the same until 2030.111
These price increases for fossil fuel and electricity obviously put pressure on the
affordability of energy for vulnerable households and industries exposed to interna-
tional competition.112 Nevertheless, according to the IA, ambitious energy efficiency
policies in a 2030 horizon can limit the increase of electricity prices, whereas RES
policies lead to small increases in prices if accompanied by ambitious energy effi-
107 SWD(2014) 15 final, p. 186.
108 SWD(2014) 15 final, pp. 19 and 22-23.
109 SWD(2014) 15 final, p. 94.
110 SWD(2014) 15 final, p. 29.
111 SWD(2014) 15 final, p. 30.
112 SWD(2014) 15 final, p. 30.
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ciency policies.113 To facilitate energy efficiency investment for vulnerable
consumers, targeted assistance may be required. Direct intervention in the market
to regulate prices is not advised. A November 2013 report114 issued by the Commis-
sion gives guidance to Member States on how best to assist vulnerable energy
consumers.115
5.6. EU ETS
The EU ETS surplus is already at over two billion allowances. In the Reference
Scenario 2013, this could further increase to over 2.5 billion by 2020, and only grad-
ually reduce afterwards, due to the longer-term effects of current energy policies
and the continuation of the linear reduction factor of 1.74% per year after 2020.116
According to projections in all scenarios (Reference Scenario 2013 and policy
scenarios), between 2005 and 2030, ETS GHG emissions should decrease significantly
more than non-ETS GHG emissions because key policies affecting the non-ETS
sectors do not include such a gradual and continued tightening.117
Concerning the EU ETS price, projections retain a significant degree of uncertainty.
Under the EU Reference Scenario 2013, the ETS price is expected to reach 10 euros/
tCO2 in 2020, 36 euros/tCO2 in 2030 and 100 euros/tCO2 in 2050. In the policy
scenarios, it is expected to reach between 11 and 53 euros/tCO2 in 2030, depending
on the specific scenario. In a 2050 perspective, a continuation of the approach to
2030 would result in 85 to 265 euros/tCO2, depending on the scenario.118 Despite the
current and projected low levels of the EU ETS prices in the run up to 2020, the ETS
CO2 emission reduction target for 2020 is projected to be achieved by the implemen-
tation of additional policies (RES support policies and energy efficiency policies) and
thanks to the economic crisis, which has reduced industrial production and power
demand.
This said, a structural reform of the EU ETS – in addition to the short-term solution of
‘backloading’ (postponing)119 – has been expected for a long time now in order to
reduce the surplus of allowances which, as shown by the Reference Scenario 2013,
will not decline significantly before 2020. Obviously, such measures require political
113 SWD(2014) 15 final, pp. 94 and 97.
114 Vulnerable consumer working group guidance document on vulnerable consumers, November 2013 (http://
ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/doc/forum_citizen_energy/20140106_vulnerable_consumer_
report.pdf).
115 SWD(2014) 15 final, p. 96.
116 SWD(2014) 15 final, pp. 25 and 55.
117 SWD(2014) 15 final, p. 55.
118 SWD(2014) 15 final, p. 80.
119 Decision No 1359/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 amending
Directive 2003/87/EC clarifying provisions on the timing of auctions of greenhouse gas allowances (Text
with EEA relevance) (OJ 2013, L 343/1) and Commission Regulation (EU) No 176/2014 of 25 February 2014
amending Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010 in particular to determine the volumes of greenhouse gas emis-
sion allowances to be auctioned in 2013-20 (OJ 2014, L 56/11).
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courage. To address the problem, the Commission adopted a Carbon Market Report
in November 2012,120 listing six possible structural reforms of the ETS. Three of them
are inherently linked to the 2030 context, i.e., the revision of the annual linear reduc-
tion factor, the extension of the scope of the EU ETS to other sectors and the use of
international credits post-2020. The revision of the linear reduction factor will be
part of the decisions to be taken on the overall 2030 framework, and will depend on
the policy option chosen; international credits need to be considered in the light of
the link with international efforts and climate finance. The decision to extend the
scope seems to require further analysis.
In the meantime, with regard to the policy options, the conclusions of the IA are as
follows: Specific measures to promote renewable electricity or lower electricity
consumption through more energy efficiency can be expected to lower the ETS
carbon price, because they typically reduce GHG emissions.121 Consequently, in a
2030 perspective, the adoption of a scenario driven by ambitious levels of renewa-
bles and energy efficiency would result in continuing increases of the surplus of
allowances in the EU ETS (thus maintaining low carbon prices), and would therefore
seriously undermine the future relevance of the ETS in providing the right incentives
for low-carbon investment.122 In other words, in the IA, all policy scenarios based on
more ambitious RES and energy efficiency policies demonstrate a significantly lower
ETS price. Consequently, according to the IA, for any given GHG emission reduction
target in the 2030 perspective, it would be better to focus more on ambitious energy
efficiency policies resulting in much higher GHG reductions in the non-ETS sectors,
and this would bring about the reductions needed in the ETS.123
In addition, the creation of a ‘market stability reserve’ is also proposed to address the
surplus of allowances. This mechanism would allow for a more dynamic supply of
allowances which would not focus on prices, but instead on supply/demand imbal-
ances of allowances.124 A legislative proposal has already been tabled by the Euro-
pean Commission.125 The idea is to introduce some flexibility on the supply side. If
the surplus in the market is above an upper end of the range, a certain amount of
allowances are placed in the reserve. If the surplus is below the range, a certain
amount of allowances are released from the reserve.126 This mechanism should be
introduced during Phase 4 of the EU ETS in 2021.
120 COM(2012) 652 final.
121 SWD(2014) 15 final, p. 23 and 33 and 55. See also European Economy, Energy Economic Developments in
Europe, DG ECFIN, European Commission. This document has also been published as a SWD(2014) 19.
122 SWD(2014) 15 final, pp. 19 and 55-56.
123 SWD(2014) 15 final, p. 56.
124 SWD(2014) 15 final, pp. 104 and 109.
125 Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and the Council concerning the establishment and oper-
ation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and amending
Directive 2003/87/EC – COM(2014) 20 final.
126 Conseil Français de l’énergie, 3rd European Energy Forum – What policy measures for energy transition in
Europe?, Paris, 24-25 April 2014, p. 29.
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5.7. Support of renewables from Member States
The IA recognizes that short to medium cost efficiency of renewable development
has been affected by the choice of some Member States to support a wide range of
technologies (although such an approach could reduce costs in the longer term, as
has been observed in the case of solar photovoltaic technology) and by national
support schemes which in many Member States have not been flexible enough to
adjust to changing circumstances (such as technology costs and level of develop-
ment). On the other hand, changes to established support schemes can increase
investor uncertainty, if applied retroactively in particular, and have contributed to
the reduced investment levels experienced in 2012-2013.
At a recent IEA workshop specifically on RES financing, it was concluded that tech-
nology risk is no longer seen as the main barrier to investment in renewable energy
technologies; now policy uncertainty is perceived by developers and investors as the
main risk.
In this context, for the electricity sector (wind and solar), the 2013 Guidelines
propose – among other measures – to move from feed-in tariffs to feed-in premiums
or green certificates. Progressive introduction of competitive bidding processes for
allocating public support is also foreseen and, from 2016, generators benefiting from
public support will have to sell their electricity in the market and will be subject to
balancing responsibilities. Measures to ensure that generators have no incentive to
generate electricity under negative prices must also be put in place by Member
States. All these requirements, however, should not be applied to small installations
or technologies in early stages of development. The problem of export-oriented
economies is also addressed, in order to maintain their competitiveness on interna-
tional markets. For that purpose, the Guidelines allow Member States to grant reduc-
tions on the charges levied to support renewable energies to electro-intensive indus-
tries exposed to international competition, on the condition that they belong to the
sectors listed in its Annex 3. Undertakings not listed in this annex may also be granted
reductions under certain conditions. Companies that have been receiving state bene-
fits for which they are no longer eligible will have to pay back what they have
received over the past two years.127
5.8. Possible increased volatility?
Finally, besides what the IA says, a last remark can be made. The development of
renewable electricity has turned things around and could produce new and impor-
tant challenges. Clearly, transmission and flexible conventional generation will have
127 So under these new Guidelines, it seems that the German government could largely uphold reductions on
the EEG surcharge, though these reductions would have to be scaled back and only granted to a more
limited group of companies.
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to be strongly improved, for the electricity market should now be able to make
predictions on power availability up to the hour, even though it was not designed to
function that way.
‘In line with an increasing penetration of variable RES-E, some scenarios are
characterized by an increasing volatility of wholesale market prices. This
development is furthermore strongly correlated with the degree of transmis-
sion expansion. Whereas scenarios with optimal networks reinforcement lead
to converging regional prices and limited volatility, a lack of or limited trans-
mission expansion may result in major regional disparities and extreme levels
of volatility in some areas. (…) As the penetration of renewable power gener-
ation grows, the role of conventional power generation capacity changes.
Running fewer operating hours, operation and revenues of conventional
power plants will be less predictable, and they will become more dependent
on peak energy prices to earn the margins required to cover their fixed oper-
ating and investments costs. In addition, increasing price volatility and short-
lived price spikes will require more flexible generation, which is able to react
quickly to changing market conditions.’128
128 Imperial College, Nera, DNV, Integration of renewable energy in Europe, 2014, p. xxii.
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CONCLUSIONS
Renewables will remain needed
Any reflection on the future of renewables must begin with an analysis of the general
energy market of the European Union. From this perspective, the last ten years have
clearly indicated that the need for renewables will remain, and most likely increase.
The threat of climate change becomes clearer, and also more urgent. Furthermore,
the Fukushima catastrophe has emphasized again the persistent public safety dangers
inherent in nuclear power. The Ukraine crisis has stressed the increasing external
dependence of the EU regarding gas, and Iraq’s struggles drove home EU reliance on
oil. Coal remains dirty and oil increasingly expensive, decarbonization is still a neces-
sity, and thus so are renewables (provided they are genuinely sustainable).
In the long term, renewables will remain needed. It is essential to repeat this. Various
difficulties in recent years have obviously reduced the enthusiasm of business and
the public for renewables, but they are still indispensible. This does not mean that
they will develop cheaply, quickly or easily. Hence the absolute need for a long-term
strategy.
The missing cornerstone of the strategy is a correct carbon price
In that general context, the repeated failure of the EU to establish a correct carbon
price remains central. This has become quite a systemic phenomenon. On the one
hand, the ETS market has repeatedly crashed (even without taking into consideration
the impact of the financial crisis). On the other hand, CO2 taxation in sectors outside
the ETS (transport, buildings, agriculture, etc.) has remained insufficient.
In a strategy where market instruments should be used as widely as possible, this
repeated failure is critical, especially for renewables. The competitive position of
renewables would be different at 20 euros/tCO2, and extremely different at 40
euros/tCO2. Additionally, Member States have tried to compensate this weak
competitive position through subsidies, which have generated other problems. So,
ultimately, distortion breeds more distortion.
With huge fluctuations for renewables, guaranteeing a stability capacity for 
electricity is mandatory
Solar and wind power can fluctuate strongly, according to the weather. Obviously,
this characteristic must be better taken into consideration in the new market’s
organization. Methods for supervising power generation/consumption/growth in
installed capacities are needed in the EU-28. Incentives need to be provided to those
who invest in stable capacities. Otherwise, the development of renewables is also
the development of insecurity.
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Capacity mechanisms have been introduced in many Member States, in various
forms. Some of them rely on prices, others on quantities. In this domain, there is a
need for more analysis. In any case, any mechanism must itself take into considera-
tion the other objectives of the system, for example, the prevention of new obstacles
to competition and to free movement.
Some national policy measures need to be better coordinated
After the rapid launch of the 2008 package, many Member States devised public
regimes – especially subsidies – which appeared later to be too simple and/or exten-
sive. They were also generating substantial distortions of competition, even at local
level.
In many Member States, the production of renewable electricity has benefited from
various subsidies, taking many forms. Different types of special transport tariffs were
also established. Subsidies (or guarantees) were sometimes offered for new network
elements. Measures were also adopted to stimulate the creation of various capacity
mechanisms. Finally, the various supports granted to intensive energy corporations
in the framework of the ETS must also be taken into account. There is no further need
to explain why the management of electricity projects has become much more
complex.
Networks need to be improved and developed
The development of renewables is a source of different challenges for the electricity
networks. Firstly, flows are much more instable, generally bigger, and sometimes
geographically different. Secondly, the multiplication of decentralized production
centres requires more sophisticated networks. Thirdly, the ups and downs in one
country require much better interconnectors at the borders.
The necessary adaptations are thus heavy and various. They require time, money and
the proper administrative authorizations. Public acceptance is also important. The
EU has taken various measures. However, some of them now appear insufficient, and
others only weakly implemented.
Research efforts must be increased
This last item is sometimes a little bit neglected. Much progress has already been
made in the field of wind, and especially solar, energy. They have strongly increased
their competitiveness, and this explains the possibility of reducing the level of public
subsidies today. More progress, however, remains necessary. It is also essential that
European industry maintains and even increases its present innovation level. Other-
wise, the development of renewables will primarily benefit American and Chinese
corporations.
